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This chapter concerns the PhD study “Making Everyday Mobility 
– a qualitative study of  family mobility in Copenhagen” (Wind 
2014) defended in the fall 2014. The study takes point of  departure 
in the everyday mobility of  11 families with children living in the 
Greater Copenhagen Area. It is empirically based on a series of  
qualitative family interviews and GPS tracking, complemented by 
field studies of  everyday family mobility. The main focus of  the 
study is to explore how everyday mobility is associated with the 
family’s processes of  coping with busy everyday family life. The 
overall research question that is answered in the study is: 
“How are selected families in the Greater Copenhagen 
Area coping with practical, social and emotional conditions 
in everyday life through the making and performance of  
mobility practices?”
Through the analysis of  the families and their everyday mobility, 
the study elucidates the how the family members through their 
ordinary mobility performances, such as commuting to work, 
escorting children to the kindergarten, going on the weekly visit to 
the grandparents, driving children to after-school activities, are not 
only instrumentally moving family members around, efficiently 
and safely getting them from A to B, but also transforming travel 
time into small pockets of  togetherness, experiences, care, play, 
relaxation, reading, work, planning and coordination. Furthermore, 
the thesis addresses the extensive labour, mobility skills and 
practical knowledge used by the family members in crafting and 
sustaining their usages of  everyday family mobility. 
Drawing from selected extracts from the dissertation, this chapter 
aims at reporting the PhD study’s philosophical foundation and 
its epistemological and methodological consequences. The table 
(figure 1) seeks to give an overview of  the project’s main theoretical 
input, the methods used and the epistemological considerations. 
Obviously, these three dimensions condition each other in various 
ways, some of  which are discussed in this chapter. Due to the 
confines of  this short description, this chapter will focus upon 
unfolding the philosophical positioning within theory of  science 
and lay out the meta-theoretical foundation and its influence on 
the epistemological and methodological orientation of  the study. 
The chapter begins by positioning the study in relation to 
pragmatism and hermeneutics and presents the implications of  
these philosophical positions as tools for studying everyday family 
mobility. From this point, drawing on pragmatism in combination 
with hermeneutics, the chapter addresses the epistemological 
question of  what knowledge is and how knowledge is produced. 
From this epistemological basis the chapter turns to considering 
methodology. With inspiration from Dewey’s pragmatic inquiry 
and Charles Sander Peirce’s concept of  abduction, a methodology 
for the production of  knowledge through the cyclical-iterative 
process of  inquiry is outlined. 
Pragmatism and studying everyday mobility
This study takes its point of  departure in a qualitative stance 
relying first and foremost on pragmatism, and is especially inspired 
by John Dewey’s instrumental pragmatism (Brinkmann 2006, Bacon 
2012, Gimmler 2005), complemented by insights from Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (Højberg 2004, Kinsella 2006, 
Brinkmann 2012). Pragmatism has a special interest in everyday 
life. One of  Dewey’s ambitions was to reconstruct philosophy 
in order to bring it closer to and make it more socially relevant 
to everyday life (Bacon 2012: 47). Dewey did not discriminate 
between the scientific endeavour of  “developing knowledge of  the 
world” and mundane everyday “acting in the world [which] were 
all part of  the same process of  learning and discovery through 
experience” (Healey 2009: 280). Hence, pragmatism is in no 
way estranged from the everyday and the social practices people 
engage in. This makes pragmatism, as Brinkmann (2012) states, 





















II “particularly interesting for everyday life researchers because it 
blurs any hard-and-fast distinctions between scientific knowing 
and human knowing in general” (p. 38). 
This study is concerned with the everyday mobile lives of  families. 
The objective is to understand and produce knowledge of  
how families use mobility as a mode of  coping in everyday life. 
Pragmatism provides an approach to the world and to knowing 
that can be used to engage with the families and their mobility 
from an “agent point of  view” (Bacon 2012: 108), taking their 
situational practices in everyday life as the point of  departure. 
Furthermore, pragmatism offers a pluralistic perspective on the 
world as it insists “on the validity of  different ways of  viewing 
and reporting the world as a function of  our different contexts 
and purposes in dealing with it” (Barnes 2008: 1547). Neither 
everyday life nor mobility exists as a single and complete whole; 
depending on the situation, they are understood and performed in 
multiple ways. By focusing on knowledge how, pragmatism rejects the 
search for universal and everlasting laws in favour of  recognising 
and emphasising the local and practical knowledge that emerges 
from practical situations. Hence pragmatism supports qualitative 
inquiry into everyday mobility practices as particular and 
contextual situations in which tacit knowledge is used in coping 
with uncertainty and contingency in everyday life. 
Moreover, pragmatism offers an interesting instrumentalist 
approach to research practice. As Louis Menand writes, “ideas 
are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but are tools—like 
forks and knives and microchips—that people devise to cope with 
the world in which they find themselves” (quoted in Brinkmann 
and Tanggaard 2010: 243) . This should be understood in the 
broadest possible sense: not only ideas/knowledge, but also 
theories, methods, models, concepts and analytical approaches are 
all thinking heuristics and sensitising tools supporting the inquiry 
at hand rather than transcendental Truths (Brinkmann 2012: 56). 
Similar to pragmatism, hermeneutic thought is interested in 
interpretation and understanding as ways of  knowing. Kinsella 
(2006) argues that due to their emphasis on understanding and 
interpretation, as opposed to explanation and verification, there is 
a profound linkage between qualitative inquiry and hermeneutic 
thought, although this often goes unnoticed. Historically, 
hermeneutics was used mainly as a methodology for finding 
what were regarded as the true meanings of  ancient biblical texts 
(Kinsella 2006). However, in philosophical, also termed ontological, 
hermeneutics, hermeneutics is not a method for gaining true 
knowledge but rather a way of  being in the world, in which 
human life is “conceived as an ongoing process of  interpretation” 
(Brinkmann 2012: 40). Hans-Georg Gadamer, one of  the main 
proponents of  philosophical hermeneutics, argued that humans 
are interpreting beings. In everyday life, we are continually, often 
subconsciously, concerned with interpreting and thereby seeking 
to understand and make sense of  the environments we traverse, 
the actions and statements of  other people, the texts we read, the 
scenes and signs we see and so on. Both Dewey’s pragmatism 
and philosophical hermeneutics regard knowing and interpreting 
not merely as something researchers do, a scientific practice or 
methodological set of  rules and procedures, but instead as a way 
of  being, something all humans are engaged in when performing 
everyday life. Hence interpreting and understanding is not only a 
“methodological process or condition but also an essential feature 
of  all knowledge and understanding, therefore every interpretation 
relies on other interpretations” (Kinsella 2006). 
From this understanding, hermeneutic thought offers a 
conceptualisation of  knowing in research as an iterative process 
of  interpretation of  a world that is already interpreted and 
imbued with meaning. This “double hermeneutic” highlights 
the process of  knowing as a two-way relation, a reciprocal 
interaction between the subject and the object, in which both 
parties holds transformative efficacy (Højberg 2004: 320). Unlike 
pragmatism, philosophical hermeneutics does not provide any 
specific methodological schemes; rather it is concerned with the 
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conditions of  understanding and knowing. Hence these insights 
from hermeneutic thought will be used in a pragmatic manner in 
the following sections, in combination with a pragmatist approach, 
as tools supporting reflection on the process of  knowing and 
knowledge production.
Epistemological considerations
Pragmatism argues for an anti-representational approach to 
understanding what knowledge is and how it can be obtained 
(Gimmler 2012). It rejects the representational ideal of  obtaining 
propositional or corresponding knowledge that simply mirrors 
phenomena in the world. Despite this stance, pragmatist 
epistemology takes its point of  departure in the empiricist idea 
that reality is and can be experienced through our senses. However, 
Dewey was critical of  what he called the ‘spectators theory of  
knowledge’ of  the British empiricists, who claimed that through 
phenomenal experience knowledge, as an accurate representation 
of  the world, could be obtained (Bacon 2012: 50). He argued that 
perceiving phenomenal experience as a neutral and pure perception 
of  reality is erroneous. Instead, human experience of  the world, 
and hence knowing, always involves primary reflection “influenced 
and prefigured by theory, traditions and habits” (Gimmler 2005: 
17). Thus, knowledge is never universal or fixed, but always local, 
contextual and contingent. Through the use of  hermeneutics, the 
consequences of  the active knower will be further investigated 
shortly. 
In addition to being an anti-representationalist philosophical 
position, pragmatism is anti-foundational, as it holds that 
“knowledge has and requires no foundation” (Bacon 2012: viii) 
neither in a privileged metaphysical sphere nor in a transcending 
logic or structure in the world. As the quest for certainty and 
universal truths is abandoned and knowledge is understood 
as always being local and limited, and emerging in empirical 
situations of  social practice, knowledge no longer requires 
absolute justifications (Gimmler 2012: 47). Hence pragmatist 
knowledge never amounts to Truth, in the traditional sense of  the 
word, as knowing can never be endowed with complete certainty. 
Instead knowledge is empirical, grounded beliefs that are “robust 
and stable enough to rely upon but always open to revision, not 
least because they have to adapt themselves to other changes in 
the environment” (Bacon 2012: 49). Hence pragmatism does not 
reject the claim that knowledge is based upon other knowledge 
and indeed should be. As knowledge remains beliefs they are 
never “permanent, Cartesian, foundations” but instead always 
provisional and revisable, as they may be proven wrong in other or 
later instances (Bacon 2012: 54). 
 
Turning away from a representationalist ideal also shifts the focus 
of  the scientific enterprise from uncovering and representing 
universal facts or truths in propositional knowledge that, to producing 
local and contingent knowledge claims of  knowledge how. As this 
thesis subscribes to this stance, its aim is not to uncover universal 
laws or causal connections governing everyday mobility in the 
family; rather it is interested in knowing how families are coping 
with specific contingent situations and conditions in everyday life 
through making and performing mobility practices. In a pragmatist 
approach (and a hermeneutic approach, as we shall see shortly), the 
family’s everyday mobility cannot be isolated from the social and 
historical contexts within which it is embedded. Family members’ 
doings in everyday life are not observable, causal processes that 
can be easily traced; rather they are incited by reasons, motives and 
beliefs, and therefore are only recognisable as meaningful when 
situated (Brinkmann 2012: 20-1). 
Knowledge Emerges from Practice 
In the rejection of  representationalism, foundationalism and the 
Platonic lineage of  epistemology, that clearly separates object and 
subject and promotes the theoretical “observation” of  the object 
(Gimmler 2012: 48), pragmatism offers a radically different and 
non-contemplative epistemology in which “we are not spectators 





















II looking at the world from outside but rather agents operating 
within it” (Bacon 2012: 108). Dewey holds that knowing is not 
a passive process of  perception and representation, but rather 
knowledge emerges in “the engagement of  the active subject 
with the world” (Gimmler 2005: 17). Thus to Dewey, “the act 
of  knowing something is part of  interacting” (Gimmler 2005: 
18), and knowledge emerges from the human experience of  the 
world in practices, not from theory. Thus in pragmatism, practice 
has primacy over theory. This also means that all knowledge is 
fragile, fallible, situated and bound “to social practices and cannot 
be maintained within a privileged sphere of  absolute certainty” 
(Gimmler 2005:18). Hence Dewey favours an understanding 
of  knowledge that is interactive with the world and locally and 
empirically grounded in cultural, historical and social practices. 
Therefore knowledge should not be understood as “fixed and 
complete in itself, in isolation from an act of  inquiry” (Neubert 
2001: 2) ; rather the understanding of  knowledge Dewey tries to 
develop is a practical one that transcends the dualities of  subject 
and object, theory and practice, relativism and absolutism (Thayer-
Bacon 2002: 97). Although knowledge emerges in practice, or the 
act of  inquiry, thinking is still crucial, as “knowledge comes neither 
by thinking about something abstractly nor by acting uncritically, 
but rather by integrating thinking and doing, by getting the mind 
to reflect on the act” (Gordon 2009: 49). Knowing is a process 
that begins with the act of  inquiry in a particular situation, but is 
tested and evaluated through reflection before being folded back 
into the world, trying to control the situation. Hence knowledge, 
as Richard Rorty (1991) writes, is not a “matter of  getting reality 
right, but rather a matter of  acquiring habits of  actions for coping 
with reality” (p. 1). 
Normativity, Validity and Conditions for Knowing 
Both pragmatism and hermeneutics place the researcher in an 
active role, by which subjectivity is brought into the research 
situation. Indeed, when engaging in qualitative inquiry, we do 
not do so with a “virginal mind, but always with ‘certain acquired 
habitual modes of  understanding, with a certain store of  previously 
evolved meanings’” (Brinkmann 2012: 39). Consequently, when 
experiencing and thinking in a situation, the researcher is already 
and unavoidably engaged in primary reflection, evaluating and 
judging the situation from a certain normative perspective against 
the background of  individual norms, private experiences and an 
existing web of  beliefs. In pragmatism normativity is a profound 
and integral part of  qualitative inquiry and knowledge production. 
Through experience, normativity infiltrates the process of  inquiry 
(Gimmler 2005: 19). Having departed from a spectator’s theory of  
knowledge, the ideal in the pragmatist research process is not to 
produce objective knowledge in the traditional sense of  the word. 
In the act of  inquiry the researcher is actively experiencing the 
world, interacting with it and transforming the situation that is 
being studied (Bacon 2012: 52). 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics provides further tools for 
reflecting on the researcher’s active role in the creative process 
of  interpretation and understanding that is essential to knowledge 
production. In line with a pragmatist approach to knowledge, the 
ambition of  hermeneutics is “not objective explanation or neutral 
description”; rather the purpose of  hermeneutics is “sympathetic 
engagement with the author of  a text, utterance or action and 
the wider socio-cultural context within which these phenomena 
occur” (Gardiner 1999: 63). As already mentioned, knowing, 
engaging in interpretation and eventually understanding, is in 
hermeneutics regarded as always located in a specific historical and 
cultural context (Højberg 2004: 321). Hence the knower is never 
situated in a ‘god-like’ position, being able to see everything, but is 
always granted only a partial view, framed by what in hermeneutics 
is termed a horizon. This metaphor describes what the knower is 
able to understand as being within the horizon, and, conversely, 
what the knower is unable to understand as being beyond the 
horizon. The horizon is shaped by pre-understandings and prejudices 
and constitutes how we see and understand phenomena, how we 
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orient ourselves, act and respond to the world (Højberg 2004: 322-
3). Pre-understandings are the web of  beliefs and knowledge that 
precedes any knowing, whereas prejudices are the set of  normative 
orientations and meanings that is brought into the process of  
understanding. 
In this light, the researcher is never separate from the object of  
study, but rather is actively shaping and demarcating the object 
based upon a knowledge ambition and is intimately involved in 
the production of  knowledge. Hence the object being studied is 
“considered through the historically and culturally situated lens 
of  the researcher’s perception and experience” (Kinsella 2006). 
Thus the produced knowledge always depends on a web of  prior 
experiences, the choice of  theoretical approach, the academic 
field, personal meanings, knowledge, beliefs and so on. Therefore 
the researcher must, as Brinkman (2012) argues, “take her own 
biography (and prejudices) into account” (p. 43). During the course 
of  this study I have come to form a family and had my first and 
second child. The subject of  the study, everyday family mobility, is 
therefore something that plays a highly relevant and significant role 
in my personal life. Hence my pre-understandings and prejudices 
affect the inquiry process, as it is experienced and interpreted 
through the historical and social context of  my biography, tacit 
knowledge, values and normative beliefs. Therefore, to some 
degree, my experience and interpretation of  the 11 families in 
the study and their everyday lives and mobility is unavoidably set 
against the backdrop of  my personal life. The fact that I was raised 
in a middle-class nuclear family, on the outskirts of  one of  the 
larger provincial cities in Denmark, has certain implications for the 
horizon from which I perceive and interpret the families’ everyday 
urban mobility situated in the Greater Copenhagen Area. Some 
of  the families’ mobility choices, tactics and coping strategies are 
familiar to me, as I have personal experience with them from my 
own life, while others struck me, when I first encountered them, as 
strange and alien. As Hastrup (1999: 130) argues, normativity and 
value are basic conditions of  research and knowledge production 
that cannot and should not be avoided. However, through 
purposive reflection, “each has the ability (however imperfect) to 
acknowledge and compensate for the influence our perspective 
may exercise on our analysis” (Hildebrand 2008: 225). Disclosing 
pre-understandings and prejudices does not eliminate one’s 
standpoint; rather transparency qualifies the knowledge being 
produced. 
Returning briefly to Gadamer’s concept of  horizon: our horizon is 
what enables us to make sense of  experiences and encounters in 
everyday life. It is a frame that encapsulates the knower’s personal 
and unique way of  understanding and engaging with the world, 
which is shaped by personal experiences, the communities in which 
the knower is invested and the historical and cultural contexts in 
which the knower lives (Højberg 2004: 234). Hence to understand 
how and why families make and perform mobility practices the 
way they do and the meanings they ascribe to their mobility, it is 
necessary to consider a fuller picture of  their lives by addressing 
the historical, social and emotional contexts of  their mobility, or 
what is in phenomenology termed the lifeworld. 
Moreover, as we are constantly subjected to experiences and 
encounters in both everyday life and in research that may confound 
our understanding and prejudices, the horizon never coagulates. 
Instead the horizon is, as Gadamer (1996) writes, “continually in 
the process of  being formed because we are continually having to 
test all our prejudices” (quoted in Kinsella 2006). This formation 
of  the knower’s horizon is termed fusion of  horizons. This process is 
the outcome of  the on-flow of  interpretations of  objects, be they 
texts, practices, statements, people, places and so on, that happen 
more or less reflexively in everyday life as well as in the research 
process. The object of  study, as Kinsella (2006) writes, “merges 
with the interpreter’s own questions in the dialectical play, which 
constitutes the fusion of  horizons”. It is in this reciprocal process 
of  interpretation that meaning and understanding emerge. The 
knowledge produced in the fusion of  horizons is forged in the 





















II relational encounter of  the subject and object, and is therefore not 
one-way (i.e. only affected by the subject’s pre-understandings and 
prejudices); rather the encountered object also holds transformative 
efficacy. Consequently, in such a dialogue the researcher’s prejudices 
are “brought into play by being put into risk” (Højberg 2004: 325). 
This means that when confronted with empirical material on 
everyday family mobility, for purposes of  both production and 
analysis, the researcher’s own pre-understandings and prejudices 
are tested and changed, which enables the researcher’s horizon to 
move and expand. Indeed, what separates the knower in everyday 
life from the knower in performing research is conscious and 
purposive attempts to become aware of  his or her own prejudices 
in order to challenge them by exposing them to the object of  study. 
In hermeneutic thought, this enables the process of  developing 
new understanding. However, a break or rupture of  understanding 
is also what in pragmatism amounts to the surprise fact, the 
puzzling and indeterminate situation of  doubt that arrests action 
and provokes inquiry and knowledge production (Brinkmann 
2012: 44).
Qualitative inquiry is an active process of  interaction in which 
understanding and knowledge are created in the relations between 
researcher, respondents and the world. In this sense, pragmatist 
and hermeneutic inquiry do create “objective” knowledge, but not 
in the sense of  the subject/object dichotomy. Rather they create 
the type of  knowledge in which the object of  study, paraphrasing 
Latour (2000), is allowed to object thereby emphasising that 
knowledge is co-constructed in interaction as a collective 
enterprise. Knowledge is inter-subjective and inter-objective; it 
is created in dialogue with others and the physical and material 
world, and as a consequence the object of  study, others and the 
world always have the opportunity to influence and infiltrate the 
process of  knowledge production by raising objections or fighting 
back. Hence, as Brinkmann (2012) states, “Objectivity is attained 
when objects reveal themselves through acts that frustrate the 
researcher’s preconceived ideas” (p. 48).
The respondents are therefore not merely spectators, standing 
outside and looking in at family mobility, its motivations, purposes, 
effects, experiences and meanings, but they are very much situated 
within the process of  interpretation and understanding (Højberg 
2004: 339). Hence their interpretations, based upon their horizons 
of  prejudices, normative values and pre-understandings of  family 
life and mobility, are part of  the inquiry and knowledge production 
in this study. The respondents do not share a uniform and coherent 
view of  mobility in everyday life; rather they represent a multitude 
of  understandings of  and meanings ascribed to everyday mobility. 
The family members’ understandings of  and meanings found in 
everyday family mobility potentially frustrate, amaze and challenge 
the researcher’s pre-understandings and prejudices. Hence a basic 
condition in both hermeneutics and pragmatism is that there 
is no universal reading of  everyday family mobility or of  how 
mobility practices are experienced, used, formed and performed in 
everyday life; instead the process of  understanding and knowing 
is characterised by ambiguity, as it is always performed from a 
uniquely situated position contingent upon both the researcher’s 
and the subject’s constantly changing horizons (Kinsella 2006).  
Yet this profound openness and ambiguity in the process of  
knowing does not entail extreme relativism. Although they are 
sometimes accused of  this (see Højberg 2004: 332-3), proponents 
of  philosophical hermeneutics, particularly Gadamer, claim 
that understanding, though contingent upon the horizon, is 
characterised by an openness to the world proven by our willingness 
and ability to change and expand our horizons through dialogue. 
To Gadamer, language, as a tool used in dialogue, is only functional 
when “we are with others in a common and commonly known 
objective world” (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2005). Hastrup (2011) 
argues, using the work of  the pragmatist scholar Donald Davidson, 
that when engaged in dialogue, the world is always interwoven as a 
‘third point’ of  view that both grants common ground and shared 
understanding and retains the dialogue in a relational hold with the 
world, one that cannot easily be deviated from. Davidson claims 
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knowledge is not based solely on the subjectivity of  those engaged 
in dialogue, but draws upon what he terms “triangulation”, a 
“three-way relation between speaker, interpreter and their shared 
environment” (Bacon 2012: 87). Hence, in producing knowledge 
through dialogue, when, for instance, interviewing respondents 
or reading a text, the presence of  the world as the factual and 
objective reality that we have in common ensures the pitfall of  
extreme relativism is avoided, as the world cannot be departed 
from without voiding and violating the process of  interpretation 
and, in turn, understanding. 
In this study inquiry is initiated, problematised, analysed and 
tested in dialogue with the empirical reality, between the researcher 
and the family member respondents, and even in solitary 
moments when the act of  inquiry is indirectly in dialogue with 
other theoretical sources, the academic field of  research and the 
researcher’s personal experience and relationship with everyday 
life and mobility. Hence the knowledge produced in the study 
can be seen as valid, not by exact correspondence to the world, 
but exactly because of  its close and dialogical relationship and 
commitment to the empirical world of  the study. The pragmatist 
and hermeneutic approach in this study should therefore not be 
considered leading to knowledge claims of  extreme relativism. 
Rather, subjectivity is a profound condition that cannot be put 
aside even in research practice - subjectivity is the only way in, so to 
speak. It is a tool through which knowledge is achieved, though 
it is always in relation to and affected by the existing web of  
understandings of  and beliefs about the world (Hastrup 2011).
How is knowledge or belief  reliably secured then? It is not enough 
for the researcher to personally feel convinced. On the contrary, 
Dewey thought knowledge should be tested and confirmed by 
others: “the method of  science locates normative authority within 
communities of  inquiry” (Bacon 2012: 55). In this study this goal 
has been pursued by building “member checking” (Saldaña 2009: 
28) into the research design, in which initial findings from the 
analysis can be fed back to the respondents and thereby tested and 
further developed. Just as the knowledge claims in this study have 
been produced in concert with family members, the theoretical 
concepts have been developed and refined through interaction 
with the academic community, literature, theories and other 
researchers. This refinement process cannot be completed without 
commitment and responsibility to the world. The empirical reality 
enters the inter-subjective process of  inquiry as Hastrup’s (2011, p. 
14) ‘third point’ between the researcher and others that cannot be 
avoided or disregarded without compromising the validity of  the 
knowledge production. 
Methodological considerations
Having presented the epistemological approach to knowing and 
understanding based on Dewey’s pragmatism and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, the chapter will now address the study’s 
methodological considerations for performing qualitative inquiry. 
These primarily draw on Dewey’s active and practical engagement 
of  inquiry, which can be understood as a “general abductive 
attitude” (Strübing 2007: 566). The process of  inquiry can be 
separated into several stages, as illustrated in figure 1 below. To 
gain a sense of  this methodological approach, each step will be 
briefly elaborated and related to this study.
In pragmatism, the production of  knowledge always starts with 
an indeterminate situation (step a), a situation in which something is 
fishy or puzzling and does not fit, or simply arrests, the researcher’s 
general understanding (Gimmler 2012: 20, Brinkmann 2012: 39). 
This critical moment is equivalent to when the knower’s prejudices 
are challenged in the process of  interpretation. To remove doubt 
and thereby overcome the problem, inquiry is undertaken. Inquiry 
is understood as a profound and integral part of  both social 
and research practices, and is “prompted when we confront a 
situation in which there is some issue or problem that must be 
resolved” (Bacon 2012: 53). Hence the fusion of  horizons is the 





















II potential outcome of  inquiry. An indeterminate situation arises 
when the researcher enters a new field of  empirical research and 
is confounded by the empirical reality at first (Strübing 2007: 564). 
In this thesis, being confronted with and having to make sense of  
the multitude of  ways families lead their everyday lives and the 
complexity and meanings they ascribe to making and performing 
mobility practices amounts to an indeterminate situation. As 
Strübing (2007) explains it, the “researcher’s ‘arrest of  action’ lies 
in not having an answer to a certain empirical research problem. 
Doubt results from not properly understanding the empirical 
phenomena dealt” (p. 568). 
However, the first step in the process of  inquiry is the formulation 
of  a problem or a question to guide or determine the scope of  the 
inquiry (step b). What arrests action is not always clear, and “[i]
n order to evoke inquiry, the situation needs to be designated as 
a specific situation of  uncertainty ‘about’ something” (Strübing 
2007: 563). Only when the situation has a clearly defined problem 
can the inquiry proceed to propose a solution (Brinkmann 2006: 
71). Drawing on hermeneutics, we might say this means becoming 
aware of  and clarifying which prejudices are violated. However, 
as Gimmler (2005: 21) points out, defining the problem can often 
be challenging. Defining the problem is an open and on-going 
process in the inquiry. As Bacon writes, “as we strive to secure our 
ends, we find that we revise our view of  what we want” (Bacon 
2012: 53). For instance, theories and methods brought into the 
study are sensitising tools that foreground certain aspects of  the 
data, shaping both the inquiry and the knowledge that is produced. 
In pragmatism “there is no such thing as the ultimate formulation 
of  the problem – the definition of  the problem ought to be 
functionally fit in relation to its possible solution” (Gimmler 2005: 
21). What the problem is and how we will try to solve it depends 
on our perspective, exactly as hermeneutic thought advocates for. 
Clarifying and defining the uncertainty of  the situation is achieved 
through the scope of  research and the formulation of  research 
questions. In the study, primary attention is given to the uncertainty 
Figure 1: Pragmatist process of  inquiry (problem-solving), adopted from 
Strübing (2007:563)
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of  how the families are coping with everyday life through the use 
of  mobility. However, as Brinkmann (2012: 180) also points out, 
in many research projects the problem, or at least the scope of  the 
research, is given. 
The Abductive Attitude
Through the process of  inquiry, “We try to transform an 
indeterminate situation into one which is determinate by examining 
possible solutions, tentatively adopting a hypothesis which we then 
investigate to see whether it answers our needs” (Bacon 2012: 53). 
In pragmatism, this suggestion of  understanding or hypothesis 
generation comes about through abductive reasoning (step c). This 
type of  inference differs from the traditional models of  reasoning 
of  induction and deduction (Brinkmann 2012: 45). Whereas inductive 
reasoning is the process of  formulating a probable statement from 
a limited number of  observations, and deductive reasoning is the 
process of  reaching a logical and certain conclusion from the 
premise of  a general statement, abductive reasoning seeks to infer 
a possible statement based on an observation. Peirce formulated 
abductive reasoning as:
The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if  A were true, 
C would be a matter of  course; hence, there is reason to 
suspect that A is true.
(Peirce in Gimmler 2005: 10)
When confronted with a problem, neither induction nor 
deduction inference is helpful, as neither can produce new ideas 
to overcome the indeterminate situation (Strübing 2007: 565). In 
abductive reasoning, however, the intent is to provide a workable 
explanation that can stabilise the situation (Brinkmann 2012: 46). 
Based on the context of  the indeterminate situation, a provisional 
hypothesis is suggested to bring understanding or explanation of  a 
given phenomenon. This “creative moment” of  suggesting ideas 
in the abductive process can be described, as Peirce himself  has 
admitted, as a kind of  “guesswork” (Gimmler 2005: 11). However, 
Figure 2: Forms of  inference. Solid boxes contain premises that are presupposed as true; dashed boxes 
contain premises that are inferred.





















II in pragmatic inquiry, the abductive process of  “correlating the 
observed facts of  the situation with suggestions” (Strübing 2007: 
565) is not unsupported but relies on a web of  knowledge, theories, 
methods, models etc. that are instrumentally applied as tools and 
heuristics, aiding in the formulation of  hypothesis and knowledge 
claims that can transform the situation into a determinate one. 
In this study, through the process of  inquiring into family mobility 
in everyday life, a series of  theories and methods are utilised as 
tools aiding the production of  knowledge presented in this thesis. 
For instance, the study pragmatically proposes the heuristic of  
elasticity as an instrumental way of  understanding the role and 
importance of  mobility in everyday family life (and as a model of  
how families cope with everyday life through their mobility). In 
this model of  elasticity, the family’s mobility is approached both 
as if  it were an assemblage and as if  it were a performance. Hence 
these analytical approaches are interpretive tools that facilitate 
the creative moment in the abductive process of  generating 
interpretations and producing knowledge. 
Having formulated an ad hoc hypothesis, the next step in the 
inquiry process is to experiment and test its validity against the 
empirical material (step d). In Peirce’s abductive method, this is 
where deduction and induction inference are applied. Frederik 
Stjernfelt describes this step in the process as moving from the 
empirical world from which the hypothesis is formulated to an 
ideal world where it is possible to “trace certain ideal consequences 
of  the model so proposed” (2007: 333) by applying deduction. 
Finally, using induction, the process returns to the empirical world 
to determine whether these consequences can be collaborated in 
the empirical material. If  so, this is taken as an indication of  the 
possibility that the hypothesis is working (Stjernfelt 2007: 337). 
In this iterative, cyclical process, commuting between the data, 
analysis and hypothesis building, the soundness and substance of  
the hypothesis grows (Strübing 2007: 566). Thus, relating this to 
the process of  interpretation, abduction is a possible description 
for what is at work methodologically in the event of  fusion of  
horizons. When engaged in interpretation, the knower, based 
upon his or her horizon, constantly suggests, tests and approves 
hypotheses of  the perceived phenomenon, allowing the knower’s 
horizon to move. Alternately, a hypothesis may fail testing and 
be rejected, in which case a new hypothesis is formulated 
(Stjernfelt 2007: 333). When the hypothesis succeeds in solving 
or engendering a satisfying understanding of  the problem, the 
hypothesis successfully transforms the situation into a determinate 
one (step e). In the words of  Dewey, “If  inquiry begins in doubt, 
it terminates in the institution of  conditions which remove the 
need for doubt. The latter state of  affairs may be designated by the 
words of  belief  and knowledge … I prefer the words ‘warranted 
assertibility’” (Bacon 2012: 53). Hence, based on “fallible yet 
self-corrective operations taking into account past failures and 
successes” (Healey 2009: 280), inquiry is the method involved 
in producing knowledge claims in pragmatism—not universal 




In this chapter the philosophical positioning within the theory 
of  science in the project “Making Everyday Mobility” has been 
presented. In doing so, the chapter has focused on some of  the 
key epistemological and methodological implications of  utilising 
a pragmatist and hermeneutic perspective. Firstly, Dewey’s 
pragmatism offers a useful way of  thinking about the research 
process as instrumental, in the sense that theories and methods 
are to be understood as tools measured by their utility in aiding the 
production of  knowledge. Thus the philosophical underpinning 
presented in this chapter is in itself  to be understood as no more 
than an instrument with the purpose of  facilitating the study at 
hand. 
Secondly, both pragmatism and hermeneutics regard knowing and 
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understanding as a profound process in everyday life as well as 
in performing research. In this worldview, knowledge is not lying 
somewhere to be stumbled upon; rather knowledge is produced 
in the researcher’s active (and transformative) engagement with 
world. Therefore, knowledge is not static, corresponding to some 
piece of  the world, but dynamic, provisional and situational relative 
to the researcher’s horizon, the subject of  study and the material, 
historical and social environment in which they are emplaced. 
Hence, thirdly, this qualitative stance elucidates the active role of  
the researcher as an unavoidable fact, and allows for consideration 
of  his or her influence in the production of  knowledge. Thus 
a pragmatist-hermeneutic positioning offers sensitivity to the 
contextual conditions of  both the researcher and the object of  
study, especially through the notion of  pre-understanding and 
prejudices. Through inquiry into everyday family mobility, we 
discover a world already interpreted by family members and 
filled with meanings based upon their historically and socially 
constituted horizons; this has implications for the choice and 
design of  methods in the study. 
Fourthly, this philosophical underpinning offers a way of  
embracing the ambiguity and complexity that confront the analysis 
of  everyday family mobility. Pragmatism and hermeneutics are 
particularly directed towards the creativity and multiplicity of  
everyday life: the unfamiliar, that which disrupts understanding 
and arrests knowing. Linking back to the second point, both 
pragmatism and hermeneutics resist any idea of  a universal 
reading or singular knowledge, and instead facilitate inquiry into 
plurality in the families’ particular lifeworlds. However, they do so 
without falling into extreme relativism, as the inquiry is at all times 
empirically grounded.
Fifthly, through the abductive scheme of  inquiry, pragmatism 
offers a methodological approach that combines the above-
mentioned points and supports understanding, knowing and 
production of  knowledge as results of  the creative potential in 
research practice (as well as everyday life practice). This abductive 
approach influences the qualitative inquiry performed in the study 
and, in particular, shapes how the empirical material is constructed 
and analysed. In this study this has, through experimentation, 
lead to a method combination of  qualitative interviewing, GPS 
tracking, mobile field studies and grounded theory. 
Finally, the knowledge produced in this PhD was initially 
envisioned to be integrated with the work of  DTU transport 
researchers in the project ACTUM. The goal was to create a novel 
transport model for the metropolitan area of  Denmark, and the 
qualitative knowledge on everyday mobility emerging from this 
PhD study was supposed to provide qualitative input and point 
to ‘soft’ factors within transport choice modelling. For various 
reasons, this integration did not occur. However, the knowledge 
has been applied in my work with urban design and in particular 
with mobilities design (Jensen & Lanng forthcoming). Here this 
knowledge, albeit not directly connected to design, serves as a 
strong foundation for understanding how people use, value and 
give meaning to mobility spaces in everyday life. This, in turn, 
has proven to become valuable background knowledge for urban 
designers operating in and designing mobility spaces.
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